Annotation
The lecture is devoted to the likely dynamics of the Russian economy in the next 20 years. The sequence is precisely this, since, according to the author, economically Russia does not set any trends at the global level, reacting to the changes taking place in the world.
I see three changes of these in the near future. First, this is the financial revolution that began in the 1970s, but became fully apparent after 2008-09: money ceases to have an absolute value, becoming an instrument of state regulation of the economy; the developed world acquires a source of unlimited wealth, rates fall below zero, the role of reserves decreases, and their accumulation becomes counterproductive. Secondly, this is the emergence of a new main resource of the economy: emotional capital, which is embodied in consumer sentiment and is manifested and mobilized in information technologies; a person as a consumer becomes more important than as a manufacturer, especially in the context of increasing robotization. Thirdly, these are the processes of decarbonization, which are now being set not so much by politicians as by business, which has realized the benefits arising in this area; this process in twenty years will determine the basic elements of global reproduction.
Russia looks unprepared for any of the new trends. After 1998, the authorities are fixated on the accumulation of financial reserves, doing nothing to increase the money supply for the sake of economic growth and pursuing a financial policy at best adequate to the end of the twentieth century. The political system of Russia does not imply the value of a person other than a producer; there is a desire to reduce costs and limit consumption, which also indicates a complete isolation from reality; technological modernization is impossible due to the investment climate and emigration; sovereign russian internet will nullify all possible benefits from the use of modern information technologies. Decarbonization significantly contradicts Russian national interests and undermines the enrichment mechanism of the elites - therefore, it will be hindered for the time being, and only then they will look for answers, but in no case will they try to get involved in the processes taking place in this area.
As a result, Russia economically will remain an adherent of the status quo, striving not to change anything. The question of what the country should do now seems highly irrelevant, since it is political, not economic. Russia will remain a moderately developed economy that will perceive modern technologies as a user, without participating in their creation and not being included in the global division of labor, even as a developed industrial country. The coming decades will not carry catastrophic threats to Russia: the transition to a post-carbon economy will be gradual; the financial policy of developed countries will maintain high prices in resource markets for quite a long time; the relative poverty of the population as a whole corresponds to the logic of domestic competitiveness. I do not see any chances for accelerating economic growth (1-2% per annum on the horizon of the 2020s), but at the same time I do not expect that we will witness a serious crisis similar to the events of the 1990s. Russia's problem is that it is gradually losing its competitive advantages and does not create new ones, and now little can be gained from the previous reserves. In 2007, Gazprom was more expensive than Microsoft, and now it is 15 times cheaper, despite the preservation of basic production indicators. Economically, Russia will continue to move in its "tunnel", becoming less and less interested in other players, but at the same time not facing serious problems. The latter may appear closer to the mid-2040s, when the commodity markets are significantly transformed, the technological gap will be finally insurmountable, and the degradation of human capital will push the country to the “third world”.
As a subject of international relations, Russia will undoubtedly remain - no one will attack our country, dismember it and conquer it. A split from within Russia is also unlikely to threaten. But economically, I would not hope that we will retain our status as a significant player. Which is probably not a bad thing - at least the post-Putin country will not have the illusions of greatness, which in many ways have led Russia into the current tunnel.